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The First Amendment Allows a State to Prohibit the
Use of Public Funds for An Individual's Pursuit of a
Theology Degree: Locke v. Davey
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE - The Supreme Court of the United States held that a
state constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public funds
by an individual for religious purposes did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause.
Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
The State of Washington provided scholarship funds to eligible
students for postsecondary educational expenses.' In accordance
with the Washington State Constitution, the State refused to al-
low an otherwise eligible student to use the public funds to pursue
a degree in theology.2
The Washington State Legislature discovered that many high
school students graduating with high academic standing were fi-
nancially unable to attend college because they could not obtain
financial aid, or because the aid was insufficient to cover college
costs.3 As a result, the legislature created the Promise Scholar-
ship Program in 1999.'
There were several academic, income, and enrollment require-
ments each student was required to satisfy in order to be eligible
for the scholarship.' After the State approved a student based on
1. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1309 (2004).
2. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1309.
3. Id. at 1309-10.
4. Id. at 1310. The Promise Scholarship Program was funded through Washington's
general fund and renewable each year. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-050(2) (2003). The
scholarship amount was based on the annual appropriation and evenly divided among
eligible students for that year. Id. For the 1999-2000 academic year, the scholarship was
$1,125 per student, and for the 2000-2001 academic year the scholarship was $1,542 per
student. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310. Students could use the scholarship for all educational
expenses. Id.
5. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310. The student had to graduate from a public or private
school within the state. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(a)-(d). Either the student's
academic standing had to be within the top 15% of the class or the student had to receive a
cumulative score of at least 1,200 on the Scholastic Assessment Test I or a minimum score
of 27 on the American College Test. Id. Each student's family income had to be less than
135% of the state's median. § 250-80-020(12)(e).
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academic and income information, the student could enroll in an
eligible postsecondary school.6 One scholarship stipulation man-
dated that the student could not pursue a degree in theology.7 The
school had to verify that this requirement had been satisfied prior
to the student receiving scholarship funds.'
Joshua Davey was awarded the Promise Scholarship based on
his academic and income qualifications.9  Davey enrolled at
Northwest College, an eligible institution under the program,1°
where he chose to pursue a double major in pastoral ministries
and business management."1
When Davey arrived at Northwest College to begin the 1999-
2000 academic year, he discovered that he could not use his schol-
arship toward a theology degree. 2 The school's financial aid direc-
tor informed him that, in order to receive the funds, he must pro-
vide a written certification stating that he would not pursue a the-
ology degree. 3 Davey refused; consequently, he did not receive the
scholarship. 4
Davey promptly filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the
District Court for the Western District of Washington, which
sought to enjoin the State from denying his scholarship as he in-
tended to apply the money toward a theology degree." Davey ar-
gued that the denial of public funds violated the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment as incorporated to
the states, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
6. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310. The eligible school had to be located in the state of
Washington, and the student had to be enrolled at least half time. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
250-80-020(12)(f)-(g). Eligible schools included private religious schools provided that they
were accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting body. § 250-80-020(13).
7. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310. The statute does not define a "degree in theology," but
both parties agree that the statute codified the State's constitutional prohibition of provid-
ing public funds to students pursuing degrees "devotional in nature or designed to induce
religious faith." Id.
8. Id. Once the eligible institution verified that the student was not pursuing a theol-
ogy degree, the State released the scholarship funds to the school for distribution to the
student who applied it toward tuition or other educational expenses. WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 250-80-060.
9. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310.
10. Id. Northwest College is a private religious school affiliated with the Assemblies of
Godid.
11. Id. Davey had "planned for many years to attend Bible college and to prepare [him-
selfi through that college training for a lifetime of ministry, specifically as a church pastor."
Id. The parties agree that the pastoral ministries degree was devotional and excluded
under the Promise Scholarship Program. Id. at 1310-11.
12. Id. at 1311.
13. Id. The state did not require students to provide written certification. Id.
14. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311.
15. Id.
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teenth Amendment.16 The district court rejected Davey's claims
concerning the constitutional violations and granted summary
judgment in favor of the State. 7
Davey appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court. 8
The court of appeals relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,"5 and concluded
that because the State had specifically treated religion in an unfa-
vorable way, the means employed by the State had to be narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling interest.20 The State justified that
its denial of funds was necessary to prevent a potential Estab-
lishment Clause violation, but the Court of Appeals found this in-
terest was not compelling. Therefore, Washington's Promise• • 21
Scholarship Program was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari22 to determine whether a
state's denial of public funding to its citizens for religious instruc-
tion toward a theology degree, pursuant to the state's constitution,
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution. 3
The majority determined that the denial of public funds for this
purpose did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.2 ' The majority
held that the State possessed a substantial interest in not funding
the religious training of clergy." In addition, there was no animus
toward religion found in either the history or text of the Washing-
16. Id. The district court denied Davey's preliminary injunction request, and the par-
ties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Id. The First Amendment states in perti-
nent part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend.
I. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part, "No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311. Davey filed action against Gary Locke, Governor of
Washington; Marcus S. Gaspard, Executive Director of the Higher Education Coordinating
Board; Bob Craves, Chair of the Higher Education Coordinating Board; and John Kiacik,
Associate Director of the Higher Education Coordinating Board. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d.
748 (9th Cir. 2002).
18. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311. See also Davey, 299 F.3d at 748.
19. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). The Supreme Court held that a city ordinance prohibiting
ritualistic animal sacrifices violated the Free Exercise Clause. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546-47.
20. Davey, 299 F.3d at 757-58.
21. Id. at 760.
22. Certiorari is "[a] writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing a
lower court to deliver the record in the case for review. The U.S. Supreme Court uses cer-
tiorari to review most of the cases that it decides to hear." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 179
(7th ed. 2000).
23. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312.
24. Id. at 1315.
25. Id.
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ton Constitution or in the operation of the state's scholarship pro-
gram. 6 As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals. 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for the
Court. 8 He began the analysis by classifying the case as one that
"plays in the joints" between the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment." He expounded on this analogy
by suggesting that there are some state actions allowed by the
Establishment Clause but not mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause." The Chief Justice quickly disposed of the Establishment
Clause issue by citing precedent, in which the Court found no
state action when government funds were given directly to a pri-
vate individual who made an independent choice to pursue reli-
gious training.31 By this reasoning, the Court would not have
found an Establishment Clause violation even if Washington had
allowed Davey to pursue a theology degree using public funds. 2
The majority next addressed whether a Free Exercise Clause
violation existed."3 The Court first examined the relevant portion
of the Washington Constitution, which states that public money
shall not be used for religious instruction.34
Davey relied on the rule enunciated in Lukumi, and argued that
the Promise Scholarship Program lacked facial neutrality toward
religion and should be found presumptively unconstitutional.35
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1309.
29. Id. at 1311. See also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311.
31. Id. See also Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986) (by giving funds to the private individual, the link to the state was broken).
32. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1311-12.
33. Id. at 1312.
34. Id. The relevant provision of the Washington Constitution was:
Religious Freedom. Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious senti-
ment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be
molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness
or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No public
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exer-
cise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment[.]
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
35. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312. In Lukumi, the Court found that city ordinance prohibit-
ing ritualistic animal slaughter was not facially neutral. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542. The
Court enunciated the rule that if a law was neutral, it did not have to pass strict scrutiny
review, but if the law lacked neutrality, strict scrutiny must be applied. Id. at 541-42. The
strict scrutiny standard requires a state to assert a compelling interest and the means used
must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Id. at 546.
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The majority rejected his argument for several reasons.36 In Lu-
kumi, the city made it a crime to engage in certain kinds of animal
slaughter.37 The law specifically prohibited ritualistic animal
slaughter while allowing other types of slaughter to lawfully oc-
cur.3" The Court distinguished these facts from the present case
by pointing out that Washington merely denied public funding to a
distinct category of religious instruction rather than imposing
harsh criminal or civil sanctions on any type of religious rite."
The Court further contrasted the city's hostility toward religion in
Lukumi with the inclusiveness of religion demonstrated by the
Promise Program permitting students to attend an accredited re-
ligious school, and excluding only those who chose to pursue a
theology degree. °
Chief Justice Rehnquist provided a historical account of numer-
ous uprisings in this country directed against the use of tax money
to support the clergy.4' Many states formally prohibited the use of
public funds to support religious purposes by including express
language in their constitutions . He also cited Washington Su-
preme Court precedent, which interpreted the state constitution
as not hostile toward religion by providing more protection than
the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution. 3
36. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312.
37. Lukumi, 508 U.S at 535.
38. Id.
39. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312. The Court also distinguished the present case from oth-
ers including McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), where the State had denied ministers
the right to participate in community political affairs, and Hobbie v. Unemployment Ap-
peals Com'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, (1987), where the State required students to choose be-
tween their religious beliefs and receiving public benefits. Id. at 1312-13.
40. Id. at 1314-15.
41. Id. at 1313. The Court discussed the famous Virginia uprising reprinted in Everson
v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), as a response to assessing tax money for
the support of Christian teachers in their teaching role. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-12. The
result of the public outcry was to replace the proposed bill with the Virginia Bill for Reli-
gious Liberty, authored by Thomas Jefferson, which guaranteed "that no man shall be
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever." Id.
at 12.
42. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1314. The Court cited pertinent state constitution provisions
from Georgia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Kentucky, Vermont, Tennessee, and
Ohio. Id. The Court also addressed amici contention that the Washington Constitution
was religiously bigoted as evidenced by inclusion of a "Blaine Amendment" which had been
linked to anti-Catholicism. Id. The Court disposed of this issue because neither Davey nor
amici established a connection between the Blaine Amendment and the constitutional
provision relevant to this case. Id.
43. Id. at 1315. See also State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274, 286 (Wash. 2002),
and First Covenant Church of Seattle v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (Wash. 1992).
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Finally, the majority found no animus toward religion in the
text or history of the Washington Constitution as well as no ani-
mus toward religion in the operation of the Promise Scholarship
Program. 4' The Court found that Washington had a historic and
substantial state interest in not funding religion with tax money."
Therefore, state denial of public funds for vocational religious in-
struction alone was not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.46
Justices Scalia and Thomas provided dissenting opinions in this
case.47 Justice Scalia first argued that the public benefits program
was facially discriminatory against religion and should fail strict
scrutiny.48 He suggested that the State of Washington created a
public benefit for high school students who met certain academic,
income, and enrollment requirements, then the State excluded one
specific course of study, theology.4 9 Justice Scalia reiterated that
no other field of study was excluded and thereby subjected to un-
favorable treatment."0 He suggested there were many alternatives
the State could have chosen to satisfy the conscience of the tax-
payers, as well as the Free Exercise Clause.51
Justice Scalia highlighted the Court's failure to defend the pro-
gram's neutrality by discussing two features the Court justified as
making the discrimination less offensive.52 The first feature was
the light consequences Davey was forced to accept as a result of
the program guidelines.53 The second feature was that the pro-
44. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Court rejected Davey's arguments concerning free speech restriction and
Equal Protection violation. Id. at 1313. First, the majority reasoned that the Promise
Scholarship Program was not a forum for speech, therefore prior cases dealing with speech
were not applicable. Id. Second, the Court applied only rational basis scrutiny to the equal
protection claim because there was no violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. The schol-
arship program passed this review. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313.
47. Id. at 1315.
48. Id. at 1315-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia relied on the Court's majority
opinion in Lukumi, that "[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral ... must
undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny." "The minimum requirement of neutrality is that a
law is not discriminate on its face." Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(quoting Lukumi, 508
U.S. at 533, 546).
49. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia suggested several alternatives,
including the state allowing the scholarship to be used at public universities where the
school determined the curriculum or toward certain courses of study rather than giving the
student complete discretion. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). He also suggested that the state
could completely abandon the program. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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gram was not discriminatory toward religion. 4 Justice Scalia re-
futed the first feature on the grounds that the Court failed to pro-
vide authority that upheld facially discriminatory statutes simply
because the consequences of such an allowance were not severe."
He refuted the second feature, claiming the Court did not ap-
proach other forms of discrimination, such as race and gender, in
this manner. 6  Justice Scalia stated that legislative intent was
reviewed by the Court when the discriminatory character of a
statute was subtle, not when the statute was facially discrimina-
tory.
57
To illustrate a concrete example, Justice Scalia relied on the
Court's holding in McDaniel v. Paty" In that case, the State of
Tennessee defended its statute, prohibiting clergy from participa-
tion in the state constitutional convention, based on its constitu-
tional provision that clergy could not sit as legislatures. Tennes-
see justified the statute as necessary to avoid an Establishment
Clause violation, and the Court accepted this asserted state inter-
est.60 However, the Court ultimately invalidated the statute be-
cause it was facially discriminatory. 6
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent, stating that Washington's
original purpose of preventing clergy from receiving public bene-
fits may have lacked discriminatory intent, but this case was
clearly about religious discrimination. 62
Justice Thomas joined with Justice Scalia in a separate dis-
sent.63 Because the statute itself did not define the term "theol-
ogy," Justice Thomas required that the usual definition of the
word be considered.64 From this definition, he asserted that the
term "theology" was not limited to devotional studies and could
54. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1318-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1319 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954), and stated the Court did not consider legislative intent
when it found racial segregation unconstitutional. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). He reiter-
ated this contention when the Court addressed gender discrimination in United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 549-51 (1996). Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1319 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U.S. 541, 546 (1999).
58. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
59. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621.
60. Id. at 628.
61. Id. at 629.
62. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1321 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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also include a non-religious vein.65 He concluded his dissent with
the belief that the state only denied the scholarship to students of
devotional theology, and, therefore, the program was facially dis-
criminatory.66
Taxpayer uprisings against the use of public funds to support
religion are scattered throughout the history of this country.67 A
widely known uprising occurred in the state of Virginia in 1785-
86.68 The protest resulted from animosity toward an impending
tax renewal that would have provided financial support to the es-
tablished church of the state.69 Both James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson led the revolt against this tax, and many Virginians
joined the crusade.7' Taxpayer disfavor was so strong that the
Virginia Legislature rejected the tax by enacting the Virginia Bill
of Religious Liberty. 7' This famous bill was first authored by
Thomas Jefferson, and the Virginia statute stemming from it gave
birth to the religious liberty that is now recognized under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.7 ' Today, most
state constitutions prohibit the use of public funds to support any
religious activity or church.73
Since the Bill of Rights was adopted, the Supreme Court has
heard many cases concerning the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses of the First Amendment. In many of the controver-
sies over state funding of religion, the Court has focused its analy-
sis on the Establishment Clause rather than the Free Exercise
Clause. 4
65. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas used the definition of "theology" as
"[tihe study of the nature of God and religious truth" and the "rational inquiry into reli-
gious questions." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1794 (4th ed. 2000). See also WEB-
STER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1223 (1991) ("the study of religious faith,
practice, and experience" and "the study of God and his relation to the world"). Locke, 124
S Ct. at 1321 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1321 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1313.
68. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
69. Id. Prior to this time, it was quite commonplace for states to impose taxes on citi-
zens to pay ministers' salaries and maintain churches. Id.
70. Id. at 11-12.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 11-13.
73. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 432 (2003).
74. Derek D. Green, Does Free Exercise Mean Free State Funding? In Davey v. Locke,
the Ninth Circuit Undervalued Washington's Vision of Religious Liberty, 78 WASH. L. REV.
653, 658 (2003) (discussing a state's vision of religious liberty).
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An early example of the Establishment Clause analysis can be
found in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing.75 The U.S. Su-
preme Court upheld a New Jersey statute that allowed tax money
to be used for student bus transportation to parochial schools.76
The statute authorized parental reimbursement of money paid to
send their children to school via the public bus transportation sys-
tem.7" A portion of the reimbursed funds went to parents of chil-
dren who attended Catholic parochial schools.78 The Court re-
quired the state to be neutral, rather than adversarial, in rela-
tions with both religious and secular individuals. 9 The majority
found that New Jersey had contributed no money or support to the
religious schools, but only provided a general program that helped
parents provide school transportation for their children. ° The
child's religious beliefs played no factor in the state's reimburse-
ment program.8 ' However, the Court warned that the wall be-
tween church and state must be kept "high and impregnable," and
no breach would be allowed.82
In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,83
the majority applied the Establishment Clause again and allowed
a private individual to finance his religious training with money
received from the state's vocational rehabilitation program. 4 The
Washington Supreme Court had originally found that the second
prong of the Lemon Test, the primary effect of advancing religion,
was violated because the State provided financial assistance to
enable an individual to become a minister.85 The U.S. Supreme
Court held that the state created no financial incentive for stu-
75. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court set forth the minimum interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. A government may
not establish a church of any kind; nor pass any religiously based law; nor force an individ-
ual to attend church or believe in any religion; nor punish an individual for expressing his
religious beliefs; nor levy taxes to support religion. Id.
76. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 18.
80. Id.
81. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
82. Id.
83. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
84. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
85. Id. at 485. The Court applied the Lemon Test to analyze alleged Establishment
Clause violations, with the three prongs of the test including: 1) the statute must have a
non-religious purpose; 2) its principal effect may not advance nor inhibit religion; and 3)
the statute must not create excessive entanglement between government and religion. Id.
at 484. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The statute must pass
all three prongs to survive scrutiny. Witters, 474 U.S. at 484-85.
Fall 2004
Duquesne Law Review
dents to pursue religious education because the students them-
selves chose the educational institution.86 The recipient just as
easily could have chosen to apply the funds toward a secular edu-
cation. 7 In addition, the public funds were given directly to the
private individual, not the school.8 The function of the state voca-
tional program was not to subsidize religious schools; therefore,
the Court found no primary effect of advancing religion linked to
the vocational program. 9 The case was remanded to the state su-
preme court to consider the stricter application of its own constitu-
tion. 90
Upon remand, the state high court held that the Washington
Constitution prohibited the use of public money to pay for reli-
gious instruction.9' The court distinguished the state from the
federal prohibition on public funding of religion by stating that
"the federal Establishment Clause prohibited the appropriation of
public money for religious instruction, while the Washington Con-
stitution also prohibited the application of [state] funds to reli-
gious instruction."2 Although the state's decision to deny the
funds made it financially difficult for Witters to become a minis-
ter, the majority believed this to be beyond the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause.9" The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review this
decision.94 A Free Exercise Clause issue related to the Washington
Constitution was not directly addressed by the Court until Locke."'
The Court applied the Free Exercise Clause to public funding
restrictions in Sherbert v. Verner, where public money did not di-
rectly fund religion.96 The Court invalidated a South Carolina un-
employment law that allowed benefits only to persons who were
willing to work on Saturdays.97 The Free Exercise Clause would
not permit a person to abandon a central religious belief simply to




90. Id. at 489.
91. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wash. 1989).
92. Green, supra n. 74, at 657 (emphasis added). The state high court found no Free
Exercise Clause violation because the state did not coerce the private individual to violate a
religious belief Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. See also Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850
(1989) (mem.) (denying cert.).
95. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1307.
96. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
97. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410.
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qualify for state funds.98 The majority held that if the law's pur-
pose either was to interfere with the observance of religion, or dis-
criminate between religions, then the law was constitutionally
invalid.99 The state law forced the individual to choose between
her religious beliefs and employment, and the Court found this to
be akin to the State directly imposing a fine on her Saturday wor-
ship.100
The majority again applied the Free Exercise Clause in McDan-
iel v. Paty.1' The case involved a provision in the Tennessee Con-
stitution that prohibited ministers from holding a seat in either
House of the state legislature."' McDaniel was an ordained minis-
ter, and he filed as a delegate candidate to the state constitutional
convention. 3
The Court acknowledged that the state's original purpose for
barring clergy from politics was to ensure the success of a "politi-
cal experiment," namely, the separation of church and state.0
However, the Court found that Tennessee would not permit
McDaniel to exercise two well established rights simultaneously,
the right to hold office and the right to exercise his religious be-
liefs.'0 5
The majority went on to distinguish this case from the holding
in Torcaso v. Watkins,' °6 where a Maryland constitutional provi-
sion was invalidated because it required all public office holders to
declare belief in God.10 7 By contrast, the Tennessee disqualifica-
tion applied to McDaniel because of his status as a minister, not
because of his religious beliefs.'9
Tennessee asserted that its compelling interest was to avoid a
violation of the Establishment Clause, and feared that ministers
98. Id. at 406.
99. Id. at 404. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
100. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
101. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
102. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621. The Tennessee Constitution stated in relevant part:
Whereas ministers of the gospel are, by their professions, dedicated to God and the
care of the Souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their func-
tions; therefore, no minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatever,
shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the legislature.
TENN. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
103. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 621.
104. Id. at 622. Prior to 1776, most of the thirteen Colonies had an established or gov-
ernment-sponsored church. Id. at 623.
105. Id. at 626.
106. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
107. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626.
108. Id. at 626-27.
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in public office would influence the interests of one religious sect
over another. °9 However, the majority held Tennessee failed to
adequately demonstrate support for these concerns; moreover,
there was no reason to believe that clergymen in public office
would be less faithful to their oaths of civil service than any other
person."0 Based on this rationale, the Court held that the rele-
vant provision of the Tennessee Constitution was violative of
McDaniel's right to free exercise of his religion."'
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, the Court
went through a detailed explanation of the rules governing Free
Exercise Clause analysis. 2 The City of Hialeah enacted an ordi-
nance that prohibited ritualistic animal sacrifices, but allowed
slaughter by "licensed establishments" of animals "specifically
raised for food purposes."' The Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. (hereinafter "Church") engaged in animal sacrifices as
part of the religious services; as such, the Church brought an ac-
tion against the city regarding the ordinance.1 4
The Court began its Free Exercise analysis reiterating the
proposition that a neutral law need not be justified by a compel-
ling state interest, even if the law incidentally burdens a religious
practice.1 On the other hand, if the law is found to lack neutral-
ity, the State must assert a compelling interest and prove the
means used are narrowly tailored to advance the interest.
16
To determine whether a law is neutral, the express language
must first be scrutinized, followed by the effect of the law."' If the
law refers to a religious practice without another secular reason, it
is not facially neutral."' If the law's effect discriminates against
religion, a deeper investigation is required to determine whether
the effect is merely incidental or motivated by an animus toward
the religious activity."9 After completing the neutrality inquiry,
the majority determined that the city ordinance at hand was not
neutral because its goal was to suppress religion.'
109. Id. at 628-29.
110. Id. at 629.
111. Id.
112. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532-34.
113. Id. at 527-28.
114. Id. at 526-28.
115. Id. at 531.
116. Id. at 531-32.
117. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533-34.
118. Id. at 533.
119. Id. at 535.
120. Id. at 542.
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The Court continued its analysis by determining whether the
non-neutral city ordinance was of "general applicability."'21 The
Court found the ordinance fell below the minimum standard re-
quired by the First Amendment.122 More specifically, the majority
determined the ordinance was "underinclusive" with regard to the
city's two asserted interests, public health and preventing cruelty
to animals.12' The ordinance failed to prohibit nonreligious con-
duct that may infringe on these concerns. 124  The majority ex-
pounded on this concept by pointing out that animal cruelty can
involve many nonreligious acts and not only result from ritualistic
sacrifices.2 5 The Court next addressed the city's asserted public
health concern and pointed out that the Church did not improp-
erly dispose of animal carcasses in open public places. 126 In addi-
tion, the city did not restrict hunters with regard to disposal of
their kill or restaurants' procedure of garbage disposal.'
Because the ordinance was not neutral and not of general appli-
cability, the strict scrutiny standard was applied which required
the state to have compelling interests and the means to be nar-
rowly tailored to meet those interests.128 No compelling interests
were found in this case. 129 The Court stated that where the gov-
ernment restricts religious conduct, but fails to restrict other con-
duct that produces the same harm, the state's asserted interest is
not compelling.3 ° Finally, the majority concluded the Free Exer-
cise Clause requires the states to be tolerant toward all religions,
and legislators may never enact laws to oppress religion in any
131way.
As previously shown, the history of this country is rich with ex-
amples of the relationship between religion and government. This
country was founded by those seeking to escape religious persecu-
tion in Europe. However, it is surprising to discover that prior to
1785, many of the original 13 colonies had government-sponsored
121. Id.
122. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The Court used examples of fishing, extermination of mice or rats within a
home, the use of animals for medical science, the use of animals to participate in hunting,
and euthanasia of stray animals. Id. at 543-44.
126. Id. at 544.
127. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 544-45.
128. Id. at 546.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 546-47.
131. Id. at 547.
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churches and state-established religions. 13' The taxpayers' vehe-
ment opposition to the public funding of religion was unknown
until the famous Virginia uprising in 1785-86.13 The government
responded to this strong disfavor by adopting the Virginia Bill of
Religious Liberty, a precursor of the First Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution.3 1 Shortly thereafter, many states formally pro-
hibited the use of public funds for religion in their respective state
constitutions. 1
35
Since early colonial times, a wall between church and state has
been constructed through the Establishment Clause, but one's re-
ligious freedom remained intact as ensured by the Free Exercise
Clause. Often, these two clauses are in tension with one another;
but, as Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Locke, there is "play
in the joints" between them.
3 6
After considering this country's somewhat turbulent history in
the relationship between religion and government, one can under-
stand the Court's reluctance in Locke to invalidate a portion of a
state constitution, which would have allowed an individual to use
public funds to pursue a theology degree. But the Court's prece-
dent and history must be considered; this makes the majority
opinion in Locke somewhat confusing.
Historically, there have been a limited number of U.S. Supreme
Court cases addressing the issue of public funds used for religious
purposes. The Court has primarily applied the Establishment
Clause to the ones it has analyzed.137 A primary rule that has
evolved from this precedent is that the link between government
and religion is severed when a state gives public funds to the pri-
vate individual instead of the religious institution.' The Court
has held that as long as the private individual makes an inde-
pendent choice to apply public money toward religious interests,
the state has neither advanced nor become excessively entangled
with religion, thus the Establishment Clause has not been vio-
lated."'39
132. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 12-13.
135. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 432 (2003).
136. Lukumi, 124 S. Ct. at 1311.
137. Green, supra n. 74, at 658.




This rationale originated from Witters v. Washington Depart-
ment of Services for the Blind.4 ' The Court held that Witters
could use the money he received from the State's vocational reha-
bilitation program toward his religious education. Unfortunately,
the majority did not address the Free Exercise Clause ramifica-
tions. The Court also refused to grant certiorari to review the
Washington Supreme Court decision on remand, which held that
such use of public money violated the state constitution.
In Locke, the majority easily disposed of the alleged Establish-
ment Clause violation because the Promise Scholarship was given
to the student for payment toward educational expenses at either
a secular or religious college. Davey, not the state, decided what
school to attend.
The majority next addressed the Free Exercise Clause issue. If
Locke is analyzed in the same manner as Lukumi, it seems that
application of the Washington constitutional provision to prohibit
public funding of a theology degree violates the Free Exercise
Clause.
First, application of the neutrality rule enunciated in Lukumi il-
lustrates that Article I, Section 11 of the Washington Constitution
singles out religion for discriminatory treatment. This constitu-
tional provision lacks facial neutrality because it prohibits religion
from receiving public funds without providing another secular
meaning.
It is interesting to note that the majority in Locke distinguished
Washington's refusal to allow public funds for a theology degree
from Lukumi by stating, "it does not require students to choose
between their religious beliefs and receiving a government bene-
fit."141 However, it seems clear from the facts that Davey did in-
deed have to choose between his religious beliefs and the govern-
ment benefit of receiving the Promise Scholarship. Certainly the
act of obtaining a theology degree to initiate life work as a pastor
is analogous to one's religious beliefs. Davey chose to pursue the
theology degree and as a result, he had to give up the scholarship
that he was otherwise eligible to receive.
Next, it must be determined whether the constitutional provi-
sion is of general applicability. As the Court pronounced in Lu-
kumi, "the principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate in-
terests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on con-
140. Id.
141. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
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duct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of
the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause."142 The Court
continued that "[tihe principle underlying the general applicability
requirement has parallels in our First Amendment jurispru-
dence." 
14
The constitutional provision at issue would most likely pass un-
der this part of the rule. It applies to all religious worship, exer-
cise, instruction, and establishment. The provision is not underin-
clusive, nor does it fail to address secular acts producing the same
evils as the ordinances failed to do in Lukumi.
Because the constitutional provision is not neutral, the Court
must subject it to strict scrutiny review. In order to satisfy this
harsh standard, the state must have compelling interests and the
means used must be narrowly defined to accomplish those inter-
ests.
In Locke, the state of Washington asserted that its interest was
to avoid an Establishment Clause violation by not funding the
clergy. It is interesting that the Court would allow this asserted
interest to stand seeing that the majority made it clear that the
state of Washington would not have violated the Establishment
Clause even if it had allowed funding for Davey's theology degree.
The link between government and state had already been broken
by giving the scholarship to Davey as opposed to the religious
school.
The Court reviewed a similar compelling interest asserted by
the state of Tennessee in McDaniel.14 In that case, the Court
found that the state failed to show enough support for its concerns
to justify the exclusion of a minister from holding public office.
The facts in McDaniel and Locke are similar in that religious ex-
clusion was found in the express language of both state constitu-
tions.
In McDaniel, the Court also rejected Tennessee's contention
that participation in political office is a "voluntary activity not it-
self compelled by a religious belief."'45 Tennessee further argued
that the voluntary activity was distinguished from the involuntary
one in Sherbert v. Verner,' where the denied public benefit was
unemployment compensation. A similar argument could be made
142. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
143. Id.
144. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 634.
145. Id.
146. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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for Davey's situation, since pursing a theology degree is a "volun-
tary activity." However, Davey's testimony stated that he wanted
to study theology so he could become a pastor, his lifetime goal.
The discipline of theology is somewhat different from other sub-
jects such as math or history. Study of these secular subjects
could lead to various careers, but theology is clearly limited to re-
ligious pursuits. Unlike the study of theology, math and history
do not tap into a person's religious beliefs.
From this analysis, it seems that Justice Scalia made valid
points in his dissent in Locke. His general analysis follows that
enunciated in Lukumi. First, the constitutional provision is fa-
cially discriminatory, as evidenced by its express language.
Therefore, it must be subject to strict scrutiny. To pass strict
scrutiny, the state must present compelling interests and the
means must be narrowly defined to meet those interests. Wash-
ington asserted its interest as avoiding an Establishment Clause
violation. The Court previously rejected this same asserted inter-
est in McDaniel and found it did not justify the exclusion of reli-
gious persons from holding public office. The proper outcome
would have agreed with Justice Scalia that when a similar analy-
sis is applied to Locke, the constitutional provision fails the Free
Exercise Clause.
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